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Abstract  
This article assesses the impact of armed conflict on the drinking water service of Basrah from 1978 
to 2013 through an ‘urban warfare ecology’ lens in order to draw out the implications for relief 
programming and relevance to urban studies. It interprets an extensive range of unpublished 
literature through a frame that incorporates the accumulation of direct and indirect impacts upon 
the hardware, consumables and people upon which urban services rely. The analysis attributes a 
step-wise decline in service quality to a lack of water treatment chemicals, a lack of spare parts, and, 
primarily, an extended ‘brain-drain’ of qualified water service staff. The service is found to have 
been vulnerable to dependence upon foreign parts and people, ‘vicious cycles’ of impact, and the 
politics of aid and of reconstruction. It follows that practitioners and donors eschew ideas of relief–
rehabilitation–development (RRD) for an appreciation of the needs particular to complex urban 
warfare biospheres, where armed conflict and sanctions permeate all aspects of service provision 
through altered biological and social processes. The urban warfare ecology lens is found to be a 
useful complement to ‘infrastructural warfare’ research, suggesting the study of protracted armed 
conflict upon all aspects of urban life be both deepened technically and broadened to other cases.  
 
Introduction 
 This article assesses the impact of over three decades of armed conflict on the drinking 
water service of Basrah in order to draw out both its implications for emergency relief programming 
and its relevance to urban studies. Both aims are important because classical relief interventions, 
originally designed for acute rural conflicts, are increasingly found by practitioners to be 
inappropriate for chronic conflict occurring in urban settings, yet there is a lack of critical thought 
and research dedicated to supporting any progress in that direction (ICRC, 2015a). The roughly 50 
million urban residents currently living in such contexts (Dross et al., 2016) stand to gain from even 
incremental improvements in programming and research.  
 A discussion on the development of urban warfare ecology is followed by the identification 
of data gaps and conceptual shortcomings in policy and academic writing on urban infrastructure 
and armed conflict. A novel frame for gauging impact is developed with the understanding that 
armed conflict and sanctions permeate all aspects of social and biological ecosystems, with a focus 
on drinking water services. The frame serves to interpret an extensive set of empirical data found in 
public and unpublished reports and research articles (from 1978 to 2013), as well as interviews with 
long-standing Iraqi and expatriate water engineers.<FN1> The sources of vulnerability of the service 
are then identified, and practical and theoretical implications discussed. 
 The analysis finds that a step-wise drop in water service quality ‘from world class to worst 
class’ has many facets, including a lack of water treatment chemicals (chlorine and aluminium 
sulfate), a lack of spare parts (e.g. alum dosing pumps), and, primarily, an extended ‘brain-drain’ of 
qualified water service staff. The service is found to be vulnerable to dependence upon foreign parts 
and people, vicious cycles of direct and indirect impact, and the politics of aid and of reconstruction. 
The analysis also asserts that, where an urban warfare biosphere has developed, the design of relief 
programming should replace its assumptions about progress through an RRD model for an 
acceptance that reality is more accurately described as exacerbations within a chronic conflict. It 
thus emphasizes sustained and integrated support to local water service operators, for example, 
and an immediate and minimal goal of avoiding the vicious cycles identified. 
 In pegging the degradation of the service directly to military or political events, the analysis 
breaks from the macro-scale journalistic approach that sees cities simply as ‘impact points’ of 
warfare (see discussion in Graham 2006: 263). Apart from the practical relevance of an urban 
warfare ecology reading, then, the detailed ‘bottom-up’ analysis of impact and services is also found 
to be a useful and more focussed complement to the ‘top-down’ ‘infrastructural warfare’ work (e.g. 
Agre 2001, Graham 2005) that emphasizes the intent of belligerents. For reasons discussed herein, 
furthermore, the urban warfare ecology approach may be considered a political engineering 
equivalent to ‘forensic architecture’ work (Weizman 2007, Weizman 2011).  
  
 Urban ecology of war and critical urban research 
 In their study of the impact of protracted war and sanctions in Syria and Iraq, Dewachi et al. 
(2014) found that the health care systems had been both regionalized and militarized, thereby 
complicating any potential reconstruction—if ever there were to be an end to the conflict. In 
pressing the point about these changed ‘therapeutic geographies’, and also tracing the 
development pathways of multi-drug-resistant organisms in war-wounded in Iraq, Syria and 
Lebanon (Sahli et al. 2016; Abu Sitta, Dewachi and others (2016) suggest the dynamics be 
interpreted through interdisciplinary analysis referred to as the ‘ecology of war’.  
 The assertion is that a complex biosphere of war develops when armed conflicts alter every 
element of life-sustaining processes, notably the ‘physical infrastructure, and the biological and 
social environments’ (Abu Sitta et al., 2016: 2). A particular set of health needs are generated by the 
complex interactions that develop as warfare (in all of its forms) incessantly ravages or wears down 
hospital staff, equipment and infrastructure, and injures and re-injures the bodies and psyches of 
patients. The authors argue that the discipline of war surgery is ill-equipped to meet such needs, for 
having grown as a response to acute (and largely rural) conflicts, and any effective ‘relief’ or 
‘development’ intervention undertaken in such contexts will be done with the understanding that 
there is no crisis. There is, instead, an enduring and particular biosphere shaped by the protracted 
armed conflict. As this determines the victims’ needs, it should also shape the range of responsive 
or pre-emptive interventions, and these are likely to be distinct from those developed for temporary 
emergencies (Abu Sitta and Dewachi, 2016; Abu Sitta, et al., 2016).  
 The environmental conservation scientific community has also outlined warfare ecology as 
a field of study that applies ecological theory, methods and empirical studies to the destruction of 
habitat and disorganization of social systems (Machlis and Hanson, 2008: 730). In a less purely 
ecological and more politically aware form, warfare ecology has served to assess the ‘pervasive and 
often diffuse effects’ of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory (Mason, 2011: 11).  
 Urban warfare ecology, then, is interpreted as the interdisciplinary study of the set of 
interacting biophysical and social ecosystems that shape all urban space—otherwise known as the 
‘urban biosphere’. More specifically, urban warfare ecology employs a range of disciplines—from 
engineering to medical, environmental and political science—to study the myriad of interdependent 
institutions, transportation systems, disease transmission routes, ICT flows, social networks and 
urban services that support life in a city. As the study of Basrah will show, drinking water services 
are seen as a particularly significant urban ecosystem within the urban warfare biosphere, because 
of their important connection to so many other services and processes.  
 Loosely applied as it is here, urban warfare ecology both challenges and builds neatly on 
programming and academic urban research. Though the current fighting in cities throughout the 
Middle East is less a novel than a recurrent phenomenon (see e.g. Davis, 2003), the protracted 
nature of these conflicts has caught the relief industry off-guard, and is eliciting collective reflection 
on its programming. Perhaps the most blatant deficiency is the enduring assumption that the 
fighting will end at some point, allowing progression from relief interventions to rehabilitation 
projects and ‘development’<FN2> programmes (see the 'RRD' work of e.g. Duffield, 1994, Keen, 
2007, Mosel and Levine, 2014), with agencies specialized in each phase passing an imaginary baton 
on to the others. 
 A number of projects (e.g. Villes en guerre (Groupe URD), Conflict in Cities (the Centre for 
Urban Conflicts Research, Cambridge University), Urbanization and Emergencies (Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative), and Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict (University of 
Manchester) are taking a problem-solving approach to the longer-term urban challenges. These 
typically consider the influence of basic urban characteristics (such as the large spatial scale of 
challenges, density of populations, etc. (e.g. BRC, 2013, USAID, 2013) upon different sectors such as 
wastewater (Bastable and Russell, 2013), energy (Lahn and Grafham, 2015), shelter (Skat-IFRC, 
2012), and public health (Patel and Burke, 2012, Rouhani et al., 2012). This body of knowledge 
recognizes the fundamentally political nature of the challenge, but generally avoids confronting it.  
 Academic research that has examined interdependent urban infrastructure from a technical 
perspective of complex adaptive systems has concentrated on understanding different modes of 
infrastructure failure. The term ‘cascading failure’ is of particular relevance to the case studied here, 
as this is defined to occur when ‘a disruption in one infrastructure causes the failure of a component 
in a second infrastructure, which subsequently causes a disruption in the second infrastructure’ 
(Rinaldi et al., 2001: 22). Efforts at controlling cascading failure emphasize solutions deriving from 
information technology (Zimmerman and Restrepo 2009) or risk analysis (Little, 2002), and note 
the particularly challenging complexity of water and wastewater infrastructure (Gillette et al., 
2002).  
 Critical thought and politics are also sidestepped in the otherwise considered body of work 
on disaster preparedness. Most of this is designed for stable political and institutional situations like 
the US (AWWA, 2001; CDCP-AWWA, 2012), and is at best tangential to urban areas in the current 
Middle East. The much more complex hybrid governance arrangements observed in the degrading 
cities of Iraq, at least, obliges a frame that can test the extent to which armed conflict has distorted 
pre-conflict urban life, possibly into a significantly different biosphere. 
 In contrast, critical academic urban studies research often begins with the inherent 
vulnerabilities of people in densely populated areas to a wide range of issues, including social 
conflict, predatory governance systems, climate change, and natural disasters (e.g. Pelling, 2003; 
Loftus and Lumsden, 2007; Satterthwaite, 2013; Shapely, 2013). Urban scholars have recognized 
technological networks and networked infrastructure to be a constitutive feature of life in cities 
(Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Coward, 2009), a source of political 
power in and of themselves (Meehan, 2014) or a determining element of social control (Mayntz and 
Hughes, 1988). While the focus has been primarily on traditional infrastructure systems such as 
water, energy, and public health, the crucial importance of the people who operate those systems 
has also been acknowledged (see e.g. Anand, 2005; Barnes and Newbold, 2005). McFarlane and 
Rutherford (2008: 363), for example, refer to the ‘inherently political nature of networked urban 
infrastructure’ to describe the complexities in the web of people employing the same arrangement 
of systems.  
 Much of the discussion of disruption of urban infrastructure networks focuses on structural 
inequalities in terms of access to it (such as McFarlane, 2010), including examination through the 
concept of metabolism (Silver, 2016), or disruptions induced by natural disasters, or by privatization 
and neo-liberalism (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Disruptions due to armed conflict have generated 
only a fraction of the critical attention paid to both the political economic driving forces of war and 
the effect of the militarization of urban life and ‘space’ (e.g. Herold, 2002; Graham, 2006; 2012).  
 The critical urban studies work most relevant to warfare ecology may be that concerned 
with investigation of the motives of belligerents active in urban areas, namely within thinking on 
‘infrastructural warfare’ (Agre, 2001; Graham, 2005), ‘place annihilation’ (Hewitt, 1983), and 
‘urbicide’ (Coward, 2008). The research sheds light on how belligerents use urban space to further 
their military objectives. The US Army’s (2008) classified field manual Intelligence Support for Urban 
Operations asserts, for instance, that the selection of targets, objectives and weaponry rely upon 
solid understanding of networked urban infrastructure and transportation patterns (see also 
Patterson, 2000).  
 The work has been built on by studies of ‘infrastructural violence’ (Jabary Salamanca, 2011), 
and ‘network-centric violence’ (Coward, 2009) in the context of armed conflict. Collectively, this 
‘infrastructural warfare’ body of work examines the intentional manipulation, disconnection, and 
destruction of critical infrastructure as a means of control, repression and demodernization. The 
top-down approach does not detail the impact on urban services, however, which include people 
and consumables, as well as infrastructure and other forms of hardware. On the whole, 
furthermore, the research field of urban studies has tended to view the technological aspects of 
infrastructure as a black box, or as dominated by technical and professional discourses. There thus 
remains an acknowledged need to ‘break down the barriers between a range of largely separated 
debates about cities, technologies and infrastructure networks’ (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 33). 
There is considerable merit, in other words, in blending the technical and political understanding of 
urban warfare ecology with the body of critical urban research—in very much the way that the 
profession of architecture has contributed to the discussion through its bottom-up ‘forensic’ 
exploration of destruction (Segal, 2003; Weizman, 2007;  2011).  
  
 The cumulative and cyclical impact of armed conflict on urban services 
 
 ‘With the changes in military technology and the strategy of warfare, including the capacity 
to target precisely and destroy a country's infrastructure, there may be many more indirect 
than direct injuries and deaths.’ 
(Harvard Study Team, 1991: 980) 
  
 It is perhaps the complexity of war in cities more than any other urban feature that calls 
classic relief efforts into question. Particularly where there is endemic violence and a lack of 
collaborative (or existence of coercive) central control—as in IDP camps, or slums—armed conflict 
can contribute to the tensions, and possibly fuel the wider war (Norton, 1993; Keen, 2007; IASC, 
2011; Pullan, 2011; Moser and McIlwaine, 2014). Tensions can be exacerbated by the allure that 
cities hold for warring factions on account of their high concentration of valuable economic and 
political targets (see Gregory, 2010; Pinera, 2011: 92), the advantage of the psychological impact of 
attacks (Graham, 2004), and the preference of irregular forces engaged in ‘asymmetric warfare’. 
The proximity of urban residents to each other further increases social tensions, by putting the 
entire population at greater risk of communicable diseases—as with the cholera epidemic in Syria in 
2013 (Luff, 2014) and Iraq in 2015 (WHO, 2015a), as well as the outbreaks predicted in Iran (Medact, 
2014).  
 The public health risks are compounded by the large movements of people into cities, as 
outward fluxes of people fleeing armed combat can occur just before an inward movement of 
people seeking shelter from fighting in other cities. Both movements can follow years of rural-to-
urban migration driven to different degrees by changes in the national economy, drought, or 
agricultural reform (for the case of the war in Syria, see De Châtel, 2014; Selby et al 2018). The 
resultant informal settlements are not usually served (or well-served) by the public services typically 
provided by local government departments, and so the communities self-organize to provide these. 
As a result, people in different parts of the same urban area have very different levels of service, and 
the social inequities arising from urban fragmentation, particularly for drinking water services, can 
increase the chance of tensions with the local authorities or neighbours (Gandy, 2008; MacKillop 
and Boudreau, 2008).  
 Such inherent ‘urban’ complexities are compounded by the previously discussed multiple 
facets and interdependencies of the services themselves. The treatment and delivery of drinking 
water, for instance, requires a power supply to run the pumps, chemicals to cleanse the unsafe 
water, and the people and institutions that manage it all. As will be shown, the ‘inherently political 
nature’ (to return to McFarlane and Rutherford’s term) of the water service in Basrah is certainly 
apparent in the construction, reconstruction and re-reconstruction efforts, even if it is not 
militarized and reorganized to the same extent as public health services in Syria and Iraq. 
 Those who wage wars clearly do not feel obliged to support the theory that progress 
develops along the RRD continuum (see Perrin, 2001: p x). Different parts of Beirut suffered 
continuously from 1982 to 1990 (World Bank, 1983; Nembrini, 1994), for instance, and again in 2006 
(GOL, 2006; UNEP, 2007), even if these most recent attacks are sometimes treated in isolation (e.g. 
Hamieh and Mac Ginty, 2010; Fawaz, 2014; Zeitoun et al., 2014). In Iraq, the experience of 
prolonged conflict was compounded by the trade embargo imposed on the government by the UN 
in 1990. Trade sanctions are so common in protracted armed conflict that they should be 
considered an integral (not distinct) part of them.<FN3> The enduring effect of economic sanctions 
in Burundi, for instance, has emphasized that problems with electricity and water services ‘continue 
to this day, long outliving the sanctions regime itself’ (Bossuyt, 2000: para 79). The impact is felt 
most directly through restricting the flow of consumables and parts required for routine operations 
and maintenance, or repairs (see also Hoskins and Nutt, 1997). Cuba’s general work-around of US 
sanctions was similarly challenged when these bit harder in the early 1990s, with a clear impact of 
reduced funding for water supply, treatment, and sanitation (AAWH, 1997).  
  ‘Dual-use’ restrictions are particularly problematic for restoring water services. The impact 
in Gaza of the Israeli denial of a vast range of material deemed to serve military as well as civilian 
purposes is well-known to those agencies attempting emergency and development efforts there 
(see PTFP, 2012; OGB, 2017). There are other, less considered, effects of sanctions necessitated by 
an assessment of an urban water system’s vulnerability. These include the degradation associated 
with the very poor quality of those commodities that do make it past the sanctions, and the 
discouragement of creative coping mechanisms by the brakes put onto private commerce (personal 
communication from Jeremy Loveless, 13 December 2013). For example, traders of higher-quality 
goods (and lending banks such as Barclays<FN4>) that break embargoes were fined a total of 
US$1.7 billion between 2008 and 2012 (Standard Bulletin, 2012).  
 Because of increased exposure to hazards, death and disability due to the ‘indirect and 
lingering effects’ of armed conflict can be greater than that caused directly by hostilities or 
immediately after their cessation (Ghobarah et al., 2003, see also Butala et al., 2010). Yet, 
distinguishing between these types of effects and more direct impact is not straightforward. In 
developing a basic 'skeleton' framework with which to examine different types of impact for an 
early Basrah case study, for instance, Barakat (1993: 33) acknowledged that ‘there is no clear 
distinction between the immediate impact of war, the side-effects of that impact and the long-term 
effects’, suggesting attempts to develop a comprehensive frame would be futile. 
 In order to define the distinction, the direct impact of protracted armed conflict here refers 
to immediate and (usually) physical impact directly from the armed conflict, such as the deaths of 
water workers or looting of spares stores. Indirect impact is understood to mean the impact upon an 
associated component of a system, usually in the short to medium term, such as the ‘brain-drain’ 
that occurs following demotivation of staff, or shortages in spares due to a lack of funds to replace 
them. Borrowed from thinking on environmental impact assessments, cumulative impact is that 
‘which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable future actions’ (Canter and Sadler, 1997: 69). This includes the lack of 
planning that results from insufficient staff over the long term, or the damaging ‘repairs’ made to 
machinery running with poorly calibrated or poorly fitting parts.  
 While there is considerable literature on the direct impact of armed conflict upon water 
infrastructure (see e.g. Nembrini, 1994; Nembrini et al., 2003; Nembrini and Moreau, 2009; Pinera 
and Reed, 2011; Pinera 2012) indirect and cumulative impacts remain wholly understudied. Any 
combination of direct, indirect or cumulative impacts may affect any of the people, hardware, or 
consumables that make up the water service, yet this remains insufficiently conceptualized. In 
much the same way that interdependent or networked infrastructure is prone to ‘cascading failure’ 
(to return to Little, 2002; Zimmerman and Restrepo, 2009), the links that exist between the 
different types of impact can in some urban warfare biospheres create effects that are irreversible. 
The economic sanctions on Gaza, Iraq and Cuba, for instance, have led to a reduction of funds being 
transferred from the central government to the water and sanitation sectors (US DIA, 1991; AAWH, 
1997; Doyle, 2003; COHRE, 2008). Insufficient funding leads to lack of infrastructure maintenance, 
which, in turn, leads to more water leaks and lower pressure in the distribution networks—and so 
higher public health risks associated with the cross-contamination with sewage (EWASH 2012). 
Considered alongside the interdependencies that exist between the different components of 
drinking water services, this interdependent pathway can be conceptualized as a vicious cycle of 
cumulative impact—as in Figure 1.  
 
  
Figure 1. A vicious cycle of cumulative impact in drinking water service, the result of incremental direct 
and indirect impacts upon the personnel, hardware, and consumables that make up the service. The 
accumulation of impact ultimately affects public health, and may contribute to the very conflict which 
created it. As such, the cycle of impact sits within the cycles of conflict that characterize complex 
emergencies. Examples from cases documented in Dushanbe (Roberts 2000) and various Afghani cities (Pinera 
2011). Based on (ICRC 2015b). 
 
 
 Based on cases documented in Dushanbe (Roberts, 2000) and various Afghani cities (Pinera 
and Reed, 2011), the figure demonstrates how direct and indirect impact can become nearly 
permanent. A reduction in staff levels followed attacks upon several members, making follow-up of 
unlicensed tapping into the water network difficult. This results in reduced cost recovery by the 
municipality (and may be exacerbated by reduced funding from the central authorities), leading to 
shortages in spare parts. The resultant reduced pressure in the network leads people to install 
household-level booster pumps—a negative coping mechanism that could result in serious health 
problems due to the risk of cross-contamination of the drinking water with contaminated soil water. 
The decline in service also reduces the bill-collection rates, and dashes hopes of relatively 
straightforward network repairs, if and when the fighting stops. After some (undefined) point, the 
cumulative impact is thus not readily reversible, and may, furthermore, increase social tensions 
leading to the urban violence and armed conflict that originally drove it (though this issue is not 
considered further here).  
  
 The impact of protracted armed conflict and sanctions on the drinking water 
service ecosystem in Basrah 
 The impact of protracted armed conflict and sanctions upon drinking water services in 
Basrah<FN7> over the 36-year period from 1978 to 2013 is presented in Figure 2. The assessment of 
quality of service is a composite of the quantity and quality of the water provided, and interpreted 
within the frame of direct, indirect, and cumulative impact upon hardware, consumables, and 
people.  
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 The state of drinking water services throughout the period under consideration was very 
closely pegged to the military and political events shown in Figure 2. The phases defined by the 
events start with the ‘baseline’ period prior to the Iran–Iraq war (Phase I); and are followed by the 
1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war (II); the UN Security Council-imposed sanctions (‘the embargo’) from 1990 
to 1996, beginning just after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in Aug 1990 and before the UN Coalition 
attacks on Iraq (Jan–Feb 1991) (IIIa); UN Security Council Resolution 986 (the ‘Oil-for-food’ 
programme), from 1996 to 2003 (IIIb); the US/UK invasion and occupation 2003 – 2011 (IV); and the 
ongoing internationalized civil unrest (V). 
 The baseline used for this analysis is the latter part of the period of political stability (and 
political oppression), from 1968 to the start of the Iran/Iraq war, in 1980. Numerous reports depict a 
country that had essentially completed at least the urban parts of its ‘hydraulic mission’ (see e.g. 
Swyngedouw (1999) and Allan (2001)), to deliver water to all of its citizens. Drinking water meeting 
international quality standards was available throughout most cities at a rate ranging from 250 to 
450 litres/person/day (Harvard Study Team, 1991; WHO/UNICEF, 1991: 17; Khogali et al., 1996: 3; 
SIGIR, 2010: 7).  
 
Figure 2. Relative quality of water service delivery in typical urban centres in Iraq (modelled after 
Basrah), 1978 to 2013. The step-wise decline in relative quality reflects the significant political or 
military events shown, and is attributed to inter-connected direct, indirect, and cumulative impact 
upon staff, consumables, and hardware. The overall quality of water service is a composite of quantity 
and quality of water provided.  
 
  
 The type and magnitude of the impact of the conflict upon the quality of drinking water 
services is expected to reflect the nature of each military and political phase. Standing armies faced 
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each other during Phase II through aircraft, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles (and, 
earlier, tank battles and hand-to-hand combat), with the bulk of the fighting and damage suffered 
in Iran. The UN Coalition bombing of Iraqi forces at the start of the embargo period was focused on 
southern Iraq. Though the bombing did not directly affect Basrah, the 1991 uprisings against the 
government there elicited first violent then negligent responses from the Ba’ath government until 
its downfall in 2003. The UN trade embargo outlawing the import of anything other than ‘essential 
needs’ was imposed in 1990, and purportedly eased in 1996 under the ‘Oil for food’ programme 
(UNSC Resolution 986). International armed conflict during the embargo period comprised 
primarily one US bombing campaign of Baghdad in 1998. The US/UK-led 2003 invasion was 
conducted initially through aircraft, surface-to-air and long-range surface-to-surface missiles, and 
the ensuing occupation was shaped by the rule of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). At 
some point prior to the UK withdrawal from Basrah in 2007 and the US withdrawal from Iraq in 
2011, the violence turned to asymmetric warfare between US, UK, Iraqi army and other troops, and 
Iraqi insurgents. The internationalized armed conflict continues to this day, with the rise of ISIS and 
other militant groups.  
 The impact of the sustained violence upon the drinking water system itself is but an 
indicator of the extent the people suffered from the degraded service.<FN6> The US Defense 
Intelligence Agency (1991) and Harvard Study Team (1991) both reported concern, for instance, 
about outbreaks of water-quality-related cholera, typhoid and hepatitis. While the effect of the Iraqi 
conflict on health is better documented in medical research journals (Pellett, 2000; Salvage, 2002: 
Table 2; Medact, 2003; WHO, 2003; Al-Naseri et al., 2008), it is notoriously difficult to isolate 
associations solely with water quality issues induced by disrupted services. As Hunter (2009) shows, 
a single short disruption in drinking water service (lasting, say, a day or week), can greatly increase 
the probability of infection with endemic diseases, if the quality of the service was previously 
reliable. The concern of the US DIA report may be overstated (or underinformed) in this regard, in 
the sense that it gives little credence to the capacity of Iraqi people to cope<FN7> (see Int Doc 006 
1991). In any case, by 2005 less than one quarter of the people in Basrah governorate rated their 
water or wastewater services as ‘good to very good’ (US GAO 2005: 18). By 2014 the figure had 
dropped to 6% (Takechi 2014), and a genuine outbreak of cholera (with at least 60 cases confirmed 
in Basrah governorate) came in 2015 (WHO 2015b).  
 
 Impact on staff: the ‘natural brain drain’  
 Iraq was, of course, not spared the ‘brain drain’ so commonly seen in war economies (see 
Burnham et al., 2009). Many skilled workers critical to the drinking water supply services left 
immediately after the start of embargo in 1991, and often those with 'middle'-qualifications (e.g. 
water maintenance technicians), joined the private sector for the better wages offered (ICRC Focus 
Group, 2014).  
 The shortage of skilled staff was most acute in the smaller urban centres and villages—
where it was not uncommon to have no maintenance staff whatsoever (Int Doc 063 1996)—though 
it became noticeable in the larger governorates by 1995, and was felt across most water boards by 
1997 (ICRC Focus Group, 2014: 13). Even during the time of the UN’s Oil for Food Programme, the 
lack of (or very low) salaries of service workers remained an issue, with public sector water 
technicians earning US$5 per month (Int Doc 053 1996: 2), and fewer (though unquantified) staff 
reporting to work (Int Doc 052 1991; Int Doc 071 1993: 15; Khogali , et al. 1996: 6, Nembrini et al., 
2003: 26). There were only seven engineering staff in Basrah’s  Department of Water  in 2001, for 
instance, down from hundreds before (Remote interview with Basrah water engineer, December 
2013). By 2008 there were approximately 70 engineers earning US$300 per month, though with 
fewer qualifications (Int Doc 158 2008: 8).  
 The lack of qualified staff has been exacerbated by what has been called a ‘natural brain 
drain’ (ICRC Focus Group, 2014: 14) over the two and half decades under consideration, as the 
qualified people who remained in service eventually reach their retirement age. The intricate 
knowledge these skilled workers had of the patchy systems that had been created is not 
replaceable, or easily transferrable to younger, less well formally trained staff (ICRC Focus Group 
2014: 14). 
 As was the case for retrofitting the sewage-lifting stations of Basrah (Int Doc 053 1996), the 
effect of poorly trained or motivated or overworked staff meant that, in some cases, there were no 
staff on hand to install the new equipment that did make it through the embargo. Equipment and 
spares imported into Basrah were just as easily misused or mistakenly broken (Int Doc 039 1992; Int 
Doc 099 1992: 3; Int Doc 132 2003; Int Doc 142 2004). Irregular payment of the salaries of 
technicians and other support staff continued through 2003 (Int Doc 122 2003; Int Doc 134 2003; US 
GAO, 2005: 27), at least through 2010 (Int Doc 158 2008; SOCMD 2010: 9). The CPA’s policy of 
exchanging the Iraqi civil service (‘de-Ba’athification’), furthermore, compounded the exodus at a 
point when it might have been slowed. 
 The impact of such personnel issues throughout Iraq is confirmed in an internal ICRC 
assessment of 92 of its water projects from 2011 to 2014 (ICRC, 2014). The extent of the influence of 
the personnel issues is difficult to untangle from those related to consumables and hardware, 
because of the importance of adequate maintenance. Underqualified or inexperienced staff would 
often order parts through the embargo with incorrect dimensioning, or were unable to properly 
install the spares, and it is generally felt that the majority of the problems related to spare parts 
stems from their improper installation (ICRC Focus Group 2014: 24.).  
 
  Impact on hardware: problems with spare parts 
 The water treatment plants within Basrah have long relied on a single source over 200km 
away on the Euphrates River (Etienne and Nembrini, 1995, Nembrini et al., 2003). The UN coalition 
bombing in early 1991 targeting national electrical power production thus had an indirect and 
immediate impact on water treatment (and, so, drinking water quality) and distribution particularly 
in Basrah (as well as Baghdad) (Int Doc 025 1991: 3; WHO/UNICEF, 1991: 17; SIGIR, 2010: 10). Some 
disruptions to water services (at al Qurna and Basrah city) were also attributed to damage to 
bridges in 1991 and in 2003, which prevented the access of maintenance staff (Int Doc 039 1992: 4, 
Nembrini et al., 2003: 7).  
 The 2003 US/UK invasion also resulted in hundreds of leaks in the distribution pipes of 
Basrah’s water network (direct impact), hundreds of illegal household connections (indirect impact), 
and the reduction of water produced for some neighbourhoods to 30–40% of full capacity 
(Nembrini et al., 2003: 14–20). Meanwhile, over 1000 water tankers and wastewater evacuation 
trucks were denied entry into Iraq, on the grounds that their stainless steel linings might have ‘dual 
use’ (Gordon, 2010: 71), as was the stainless steel required for wastewater treatment plants 
(Remote interview with Basrah water engineer, December 2013). 
 Though diesel fuel and petrol remained readily available for electrical generators to run 
water treatment plants, booster stations, and sewage lifting stations, difficulties importing spare 
parts for these made water treatment and supply throughout the rest of the 1990s intermittent and 
unreliable, at best (Int Doc 025 1991; Int Doc 044 1992; Etienne and Nembrini, 1995). In hindsight, 
most hardware-related disruptions to the service were caused by the lack of availability of spares, 
due to the embargo and/or looting. In particular, shortages of aluminium-sulfate dosing 
equipment<FN8> reduced the quality of water treatment (Int Doc 025, 1991, Int Doc 032 1992; 
Etienne and Nembrini, 1995), and broken chlorination pumps led to ‘haphazard’ treatment (Int Doc 
032 1992: 17).  
 The poor quality of spares that the ministries, municipalities and international organizations 
managed to get through the embargo may have been as much a problem as their lack of 
availability. From very small chlorine- and alum-dosing pumps to very large water booster pumps, 
reliable treatment and delivery of drinking water requires equipment that is designed and built to 
standards that fit the rest of the system that they are part of. The pre-1990 heavy reliance of the 
Iraqi water authorities upon top-quality European parts (filters from the Netherlands, for example, 
or pumps from Germany and Scotland (Int Doc 061, 1991)), thus ensured they were vulnerable to 
the embargo (Int Doc 059 1998). Chinese and Iranian companies proved more willing than their 
European counterparts to supply parts that others could bring in around the embargo, but the host 
of spares available in these markets (sometimes at one thirtieth the cost)  would rarely match the 
micromillimetre tolerances required of finely machined parts, and so could not be finely calibrated 
(Remote interview with Basrah water engineer, December 2013; ICRC Focus Group, 2014). 
 Though over 100 European chlorine-dosing devices were repaired to high standards in 
Baghdad (and at a much lower cost than imports) (ICRC 029 2000), the once sizeable local 
manufacturing industry is considered to have been ‘on its knees’ by the mid-1990s (ICRC Focus 
Group, 2014: 15). This poor situation with spare parts also led to their ‘cannibalization’, a term used 
to describe the removal of functional equipment from a lower-priority part of a water system to a 
higher-priority part. Predicted to occur early on (US DIA, 1991), the practice ensured sustained 
water supply to hospitals and health centres in Basrah and elsewhere, at least through 1991 (Int Doc 
025 1991). Cannibalization of equipment was compounded by looting immediately after the 2003 
invasion (Int Doc 134 2003: 4; Nembrini et al., 2003: 26), and beyond (Int Doc 147 2004; Int Doc 158 
2008; Remote interview with Basrah water engineer, November 2015), leading to further 
deterioration of the electrical power supply, and a renewed reliance on electrical generators (Int 
Doc 128 2003). Though revenues from oil began flowing to the CPA in the years that followed, 
spending remained unevenly distributed throughout the country. International donors began to 
fund hardware for new projects, but not always its installation, or its operation and maintenance 
costs (ICRC Focus Group, 2014: 6–7). British authorities installed many short-lived Compact 
Units<FN9> in the villages, for example, while US plans to replace the main canal feeding Basrah 
with a large-diameter transmission pipe never materialized (Remote interview with Basrah water 
engineer, November 2015).  
 
  Impact on consumables: alum, chlorine, cholera 
 The relative importance of hardware and consumables is put firmly into perspective in the 
Harvard Team’s report: ‘Direct physical damage, either from the bombing or looting during the civil 
uprisings, was found to be only a minor factor in the impairment of water and wastewater systems. 
The primary rate-limiting factors are lack of spare parts and supplies of chlorine and erratic electric 
supply’ (Doleh and Piper, 1991: 1). The consumables most directly affected by the protracted 
conflict and embargo in Iraq were the chlorine and aluminium sulphate (more commonly referred to 
as ‘alum’) required for water treatment, particularly in Baghdad and Basrah. There was an acute 
shortage of these following the imposition of the embargo (Int Doc 043 1991; CARE International, 
1997) and they were recognized as a major limiting factor shortly after the UN Coalition’s bombing 
(Int Doc 041 1991; Int Doc 032 1992; Int Doc 044 1992).  
 Iraqi-produced alum was low in quality (CARE International, 1997; ICRC Focus Group, 2014: 
25), meaning the sediment suspended in the muddy water of the Tigris, Euphrates or Shatt al Arab 
rivers could only be poorly flocculated, making the water much more difficult to disinfect effectively 
with chlorine. The good-quality chlorine produced in Basrah that once supplied the entire country 
was in severe shortage by 1993 (Int Doc 031 1996; Remote interview with Basrah water engineer, 
November, 2015). The Chinese-imported chlorine supplied by the Iraqi water authorities throughout 
the country contained impurities, leading to blockage of the chlorine-dosing pipes and thus further 
increasing the need for the ever-decreasing maintenance or replacement of the pipe (CARE 
International, 1997).  
 In a somewhat perverse beneficial relationship, there were no chlorine shortages during the 
worst periods of armed conflict, as very few water treatment plants still operated, creating little 
demand for it (Doleh and Piper, 1991). Shortages in chlorine dioxide gas began soon afterwards, 
however, with treatment plant operators in Basrah obliged to replace chlorine with bleaching 
powder, a practice also observed in Nassiriah, Najaf and Kerbalah (Int Doc 114 1991). As neither the 
operators nor the treatment plants were prepared to work with bleaching powder, any 
improvements in water quality are judged as marginal (Int Doc 025 1991, Int Doc 032 1992).<FN10>  
 The resumption of chlorine gas delivery to Basrah in 1992 is credited with a general 
improvement in the level of domestic water services (in contrast to the situation in Baghdad (CARE 
International, 1997: 8)). Along with alum and alum-dosing equipment, higher-quality chlorine was 
one of the first requests made by the various water boards under Resolution 986 (Int Doc 020, 
1997). As a result, chlorine shortages appeared to subside from 1998, even if the gas cylinders were 
not handled safely on site by underqualified staff (ICRC Focus Group, 2014: 24).  
 Chlorine and alum shortages re-emerged following the US/UK invasion (Int Doc 122 2003, 
Int Doc 134 2003), and reliable and quality supplies were still wanting in 2008 (Int Doc 158 2008). By 
2015 there was essentially no chlorine treatment of any of Basrah’s piped drinking water, meaning 
the overall microbiological quality of the drinking water (and, by extension, the service) was lower 
than the previous low at the start of the embargo period (Remote interview with Basrah water 
engineer, November 2015). While the quantity of water produced in 2015 was generally sufficient, 
its high salinity meant that all those who could afford to purchased bottled water. Those who could 
not afford bottled water continued to rely on the unchlorinated piped water, which, when cross-
contaminated with sewage water, was blamed in part for the 2015 cholera outbreak (WHO, 2015b).  
 
 Vulnerabilities of the drinking water service ecosystem in Basrah 
 Though the perseverance of Iraqi water workers at times slowed or reversed the step-wise 
decline of the Basrah drinking water service, every improvement was curtailed by the enduring 
effect of the trade embargo or renewed fighting. Any relapse into overt violence—or return to a 
sanctions regime—is likely to quickly reverse any gains made in what appears to be a substantially 
altered urban biosphere. The precariousness of the drinking water ecosystem is credited to at least 
three vulnerabilities: dependence on foreign parts and people, the accumulation of impact, and the 
politics of aid and reconstruction.<FN11> 
 
 Vulnerability induced by dependence upon foreign parts and people 
 The technical qualifications of engineers in ministries, consulting bureaus and construction 
firms throughout Iraq was very high in the 1980s, yet most of the large water treatment stations 
had been constructed, operated and maintained with considerable involvement of foreign 
expertise. This left drinking water systems particularly vulnerable to the predictable departure of 
such staff, as, for instance, during the 1991 UN bombing campaign (Int Doc 032 1992, Int Doc 044 
1992). Water treatment plants built at the end of the 1980s were fitted with high-technology 
equipment (Int Doc 025 1991), which, furthermore, required highly skilled foreign operators who 
were in short supply even before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Always a disadvantage to a country 
suffering a war, the phenomenon affected the modern, tertiary-level Basrah sewage treatment 
plant, a planned upgrade of which was 90% complete at the start of the fighting—at which point the 
(Indian) contractors fled. The dependence continues, with a Turkish company taking over the 
upgrade in 2009 but unable to complete its work due to mismanagement (Remote interview with 
Basrah water engineer, November 2015), which led to the Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency’s plans to rehabilitate the city’s entire drinking water system (Takechi, 2014).  
 Apart from the effect of abandoning projects during bombing campaigns, Iraq’s reliance on 
foreign expertise also created a ‘technological dependence’ which became difficult to escape (Int 
Doc 044 1992: 13). It was rarely possible to bring enough foreign technical know-how into Iraq to 
tackle complex technical difficulties, and training programmes only ever managed to reach dozens 
of the thousands required (Int Doc 132 2003, US GAO, 2005: 26). New projects or repairs that 
required such expertise were typically abandoned (Int Doc 032 1992), at least during the early 
phases under consideration here. The ability of the occupying forces or international organizations 
and NGOs to help fill this gap proved very limited indeed, in part because expatriate engineers were 
never committed to long missions (Int Doc 027 1996, WICRC 024, 1998).  
 
 Vulnerability induced by cumulative impact 
 The step-wise decline in the quality of the drinking water service in Basrah has been read as 
the result of an accumulation of combined, incremental direct and indirect impacts of war and 
embargo on service people, hardware and consumables. Much of this is related to the degraded 
electrical power system (Int Doc 059 1998) and failing economy, and is evident in the demotivation 
and other opaque manifestations that occurred in step with the degradation of the general warfare 
ecology. At some point during the protracted conflict, water service staff were caught in emergency 
or response mode and stopped planning altogether. With most of the qualified people who had not 
left the country now retired, the messy patchwork of systems that made up the water service  
proved too complicated to operate or upgrade. Though water still filled the distribution pipes in 
2015, its very poor microbiological quality meant that it was drunk only by those who could not 
afford to purchase bottled water (Remote interview with Basrah water engineer, December 2013). 
The published advice on disaster preparedness is of little use when a system has been transformed 
so completely from world-class to worst-class, and from safe to dangerous. 
 A large part of this system’s vulnerability stems from the predictable and justifiable 
responses of the service operators, such as the cannibalization of parts. In situations where good-
quality spares are impossible or very lengthy to procure, however, the activity is the first step down 
a slippery path. Not only are the systems that the parts are cannibalized from never likely to operate 
again, relaxation of the pressure to render the higher-priority system operational can tend to reduce 
efforts to seek replacements—and thus lead to an inevitable repeated failure of the more important 
system. Throughout Iraq, the accumulating impact of the war and sanctions ultimately led to a drop 
in design criteria from national standards (based on British Standards) under a new operating logic 
of ‘semi-sustainability’ (Etienne and Nembrini, 1995). The rationale for this suboptimal design was 
based on an acknowledgement that the regular delivery and installation of spares required by any 
complex system was not achievable. It may thus have appeared more pragmatic to maintain 
minimal operations capacity for an interim period in the hope that a return to ‘normal’ was 
imminent, i.e. that the embargo would be lifted (Int Doc 044 1992: 7; ICRC Focus Group, 2014: 7). In 
situations where sanctions are not lifted or that are, in effect, just a return to chronic crisis within a 
warfare biosphere, however, pragmatic efforts can have little enduring positive effect.  
 Vulnerabilities related to the cumulative impact upon the people running the service stem 
from both the brain-drain and the reliance on foreign workers. It would be difficult to exaggerate 
the benefit of the constant presence of devoted local staff who are intimate with the particularities 
and idiosyncrasies of any service, particularly one that has been patched up as often as that of 
Basrah. The retirement of such staff over the duration of prolonged conflicts (the so-called ‘natural’ 
brain-drain) may be even more damaging than the exodus of skilled labour out of the country, in the 
sense that their knowledge is irreplaceable and cannot be recovered by a sudden influx of skilled 
Iraqi (or foreign) labour, or the typical capacity-development programmes discussed in the previous 
section.  
 
 Vulnerability enhanced by the politics of aid and reconstruction  
 Just as the impacts of the protracted conflict have been shown to reflect the conflict’s 
nature across different phases, reconstruction efforts very much reflect the preferences and 
commitment of the ruling authorities of the time. This is the ‘inherently political’ side of 
interdependencies of urban infrastructure during wartime (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008) and 
arguably present in any urban warfare biosphere. The Ba’ath government’s response to the UN-
imposed embargo, for instance, clearly privileged certain cities and regions over others (generally 
disadvantaging Basrah city and governorate). Reconstruction efforts by the Coalition Provisional 
Authority were also asymmetrically distributed, as the poor security situation disfavoured areas in 
the centre and south of the county (US GAO, 2005), and favoured the predominantly Kurdish areas 
in the north. Nearly two billion dollars targeted by the US authorities for water and sanitation was 
later reallocated to security, justice, and employment-development sectors (US GAO, 2005; SIGIR, 
2013: 59), furthermore, the bulk of the US$500M of water projects implemented during the 
occupation were judged to have had major or minor deficiencies (SIGIR, 2013: Fig 1.2).  
 While it is clearly difficult to gauge reconstruction needs at any particular point in an 
extended armed conflict, knowledge of the context certainly helps. A 2003 US government strategy 
document heaps all of the blame for the ‘outdated … and badly dilapidated’ state of Iraq’s drinking 
water systems on the Ba’ath government, for example, and none for the effects of the UN embargo 
(USAID, 2003: 1). Convinced that progress passes through phases of relief, rehabilitation, and 
development, the same report and other needs assessments (e.g. UN-World Bank, 2003; US GAO, 
2005; Baker and Hamilton, 2006) suggest that the reconstruction phase was to shift into long-term 
development planning in 2004. But in many parts of the country a ‘recovery’ phase was certainly 
delayed, and arguably never really entered into. The British armed forces in Basrah left little more 
behind than dozens of short-lived Compact Units, and new village water networks that are still 
waiting for an adequate water source (Remote interview with Basrah water engineer, November 
2015). An ICRC report of the same time was more realistic, foreseeing a lag before the re-activation 
of the former Oil-for-Food supply pipeline would be possible, and expecting that lack of quality 
spare parts would remain an issue until the reconstruction funds that had been committed began to 
flow (Int Doc 122 2003: 6).  
 The glut of implementing agencies following the 2003 US invasion exposes the 
opportunistic character of some actors in the industry, with very few NGOs active towards what 
turned out to be the end of the sanctions period. The general failure of the UN’s Oil for Food 
Programme to reduce the suffering of people throughout Iraq (particularly those punished by the 
contemporary Iraqi government (Joyner, 2003)) furthermore exposes the invalidity of the self-
financing assumptions upon which Iraqi ‘reconstruction’ efforts were based. The same may be said 
for the dashed US hopes that a combination of oil wealth and a more open marketplace would help  
the country’s systems off their knees (as early as 2004, in some estimates) (ICRC Focus Group, 
2014). Despite the wealth, the country generally has not managed to return to pre-1980 conditions, 
and neither, certainly, has the drinking water service in Basrah.  
 
 Learning from the urban warfare ecology reading 
 To summarize the urban warfare ecology reading of the impact of armed conflict on the 
drinking water service of Basrah: the degradation may be traced to the brain-drain (in the 
immediate, short and long-term), the lack of good-quality spare parts (where cannibalization of 
parts eventually led to a deterioration in planning, and poor-quality spares led to a patchwork 
system), and the limited availability of the treatment chemicals alum and chlorine. The evidence 
clearly shows that the poor quality of drinking water service that residents currently receive has its 
roots in the previous decades of armed conflict and sanctions (see ICRC, 2014). Conceived as a slide 
down the vicious cycle of cumulative impact, the main initiating factor was the indirect impact 
caused by the violent conflict and the UN trade sanctions, and chiefly the economic aspects of the 
latter. The service has been shown to be vulnerable to dependence upon foreign parts and people, 
sensitivity to vicious cycles of direct and indirect impact, and the politics of aid and of 
reconstruction.  
 
 Implications for relief programming 
 The analysis implies that relief programming in urban warfare biospheres should seek first 
and foremost to avoid the predictable vicious cycles. One path towards this is the reduction of 
vulnerabilities induced by reliance on foreign parts and people, or by the politics of aid and 
reconstruction. Most relevant to local municipalities, agencies and ministries, the former suggests 
that strengthening national capacity in all regards (e.g. technical or social knowledge, industrial 
production, construction capacity, etc.) will render urban services more resilient. This is, of course, 
much easier said than done for communities and institutions beset by protracted conflict, but 
highlights the importance of low-risk capacity-building and training programmes.  
 Addressing the vulnerability induced by the politics of aid and reconstruction in urban 
warfare biospheres obliges us to question the way that the relief industry is structured, including the 
duration of its commitment and its founding assumptions (see e.g. ICRC, 2016). Even the few 
international organizations that have maintained a long-term presence in Iraq (e.g. Unicef and the 
ICRC) have not been able to plan more than one year ahead, and this has also been the case for 
those that rushed in after 2003. Short-term planning reflects the donor preference (or industry 
standard) for distinguishing between emergency and ‘development’ assistance—the ‘post-war’ 
thinking based on a hope that the armed conflict will end within a predictable and manageable 
period of time. The classic humanitarian time-bound funding sources which limit the NGOs 
dependent on them to six-month funding cycles (see e.g. Olsen et al., 2003) seems excessively and 
myopically short, in this regard. Using such funding models to address the challenges of urban 
warfare biospheres can be read as negligent of so-called humanitarian ideals, and the people most 
affected. Longer-term and more flexible funding (as by the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) in Yemen—see McElhinney, 2014) will likely support better programming, 
though it would necessarily entail less stringent monitoring of spending.  
 Rethinking the RRD paradigm in urban ecologies of war is key for operational staff, as well. 
In their call for a shift from that paradigm, the ICRC (2015) suggested that international agencies 
improve their logistical and technical capacity in order to better support local water service 
operators—a point made by several others, on different foundations (e.g. Duffield, 1994; Smirl, 
2009; Mosel and Levine, 2014). That capacity is typically constrained by short-term contracts and 
staff with managerial—rather than technical—experience and expertise. Effective long-term 
programming throughout the exacerbations of chronic crises obliges external relief workers to get 
into the full detail of proper service delivery, beyond disaster preparedness and prepositioning of 
stocks, to understanding and addressing the classic ‘development’ issues of e.g. financing, 
innovative technology and asset management (see e.g. Verhoeven et al., 2015), and technical 
support to the very large and complex systems that the local operators manage.  
 
 Relevance to urban studies  
 More effective relief programming will also benefit from pushing the envelope that 
constrains our collective understanding—through a more appropriate research base, for instance. In 
short, this means more critical and innovative policy-oriented research to support the shift in 
paradigm, as well as critical research that is more engaged with those delivering and funding the 
service.  
 The evidence reviewed through the urban warfare ecology approach suggests ways in 
which the degradation of services may be linked with ‘infrastructural warfare’ research into the 
intentional destruction of infrastructure as a means of social control. The motives of those who 
created the direct (and, also, the indirect and cumulative) impacts were not examined, however, 
and the effects not gauged in terms of repression. The analysis has emphasized that it is the 
cumulative impact of the UN trade sanctions that is most concerning, suggesting that the drinking 
water services are more a victim than a target of conflict (in the case of Basrah, at least). The point 
requires contextualization, first because conclusions drawn about the drinking water services of one 
city (Basrah) do not hold for the interdependent infrastructure in the same city, or in other cities. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the devastating consequences of the degradation of the 
service are similar, whether the damage is intentional or not. The findings thereby oblige 
consideration of the drivers of the violence that initiated the degradation. Targeted research into 
the geopolitics of the sanctions would help situate this article’s analysis more accurately, as would 
investigation of the awareness and intent of the belligerents involved. The way that water services 
may serve as a tool of conflict (Jaubert et al., 2014) or contribute to existing tensions (as in Figure 2, 
and CinC, 2012) would be especially useful, in this regard. 
 In Basrah, the alteration of the social and biological processes that make up the drinking 
water service has led to the development of short-term coping mechanisms and long-term adaptive 
practices, and, likely, an increased incidence of communicable diseases (though that has not been 
studied here). But there are also distinctions to be made with the ‘changing therapeutic 
geographies’ that Dewachi et al. (2014) noted with respect to the public health services in Iraq and 
Syria. Within Basrah’s warfare biosphere, the protracted armed conflict and trade sanctions have 
transformed the drinking water service ecosystem in a number of ways. Internal and transnational 
supply lines have been established, interrupted, dissolved, and created anew; much less qualified 
staff deal with a much more complex and complicated system; and coping mechanisms at every 
level have altered the once highly central and hierarchical management of the sector to one of 
overlapping hybrid governance (see e.g. Shapely, 2013). On the whole, however, the drinking water 
service of Basrah has not been militarized or reorganized to the extent that public health services 
have been, for reasons that merit further investigation.  
 There are parallels to be drawn between this insight into damage to complex engineering 
systems and the ballistics analysis of the damage—as in ‘forensic architecture’ work (Weizman, 
2011). It follows that a blend of technical engineering awareness of the functioning of water services 
with ballistics expertise and sharp social/political science will serve to move us closer to the roots of 
the problem.  
 The analysis’s focus on indirect and cumulative impact further draws attention to the 
extension in space and in time of armed conflict. Even relatively precise attacks on military targets 
can cause knock-on effects along the vicious cycle identified here, well beyond the direct impact 
zone of the explosive and long after the dust has settled. Such ‘reverberating effects’ of weaponry 
are the subject of debates about military targeting and proportionality in International 
Humanitarian Law (ICRC, 2015b: 5; Robinson and Nohle, 2017; Zeitoun and Talhami 2017), and are 
attracting campaigns against the use of wide-area explosives in populated areas (e.g. Brehm and 
Borrie, 2010; Rappert et al., 2012). 
 Examination of the impact of armed conflict through interdisciplinary urban warfare 
ecology has not only allowed sight of the extent of one aspect of a greater urban transformation, it 
also shines a spotlight on the very mechanisms of the transformation itself. Application of the 
frame to other services (e.g. solid waste, energy, health) and other urban warfare biospheres (e.g. 
Aleppo, Beirut, Donetsk, Gaza, Ta’iz) will reveal yet more of the enduring and otherwise hidden 
impacts of war.   
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<NUMBERED FOOTNOTES> 
<FN1>The limits of this article’s analysis are bounded primarily by the extensive empirical data 
analyzed. The bulk of this derives from unpublished reports from relief agencies active in the sector 
in Iraq, and individual or group interviews with employees of the same agencies (but not those on 
recent, direct fieldwork). Among the many important issues and methods thus excluded are the 
coping mechanisms developed by people; the intent of the belligerents; and ballistics analysis of  
damage. 
<F2>The corresponding limitations of capacities and operational modes developed for much smaller-
scale and less complex rural settings has been well noted (see Janneck, et al., 2012, Sanderson, et 
al., 2012, Lucchi, 2013, Bryant and Campbell, 2014).  
<F3>It is next to impossible to separate the impact of the sanctions from the impact of armed 
conflict and neglect. The visible results in Iraq have been cumulative, a combined effect on a time 
continuum over 30 years of multiple crises and bad management (ICRC Focus Group, 2014).  
<FN4>Other banks and companies include ABN Amro, Lloyds TSB, Chevron and DHL (for trading with 
Iran, Lybia, Syria, Sudan, Cuba, Burma, Liberia). 
<FN5>The experience of Basrah is considered to be broadly representative of large urban centres 
throughout Iraq, with the notable exceptions of Baghdad and cities in the northern Kurdish parts of 
the country during the sanctions period (1990 to 2003). Both sets of urban centres fared better than 
Basrah during this period, the former because the Iraqi government favoured it, and the latter 
because it was beyond its reach. The population of the city of Basrah was roughly 2.7 million in the 
1980s, and 3.4 million by 2015. 
<FN6>This article’s analysis remains focused on disruptions to services, and so does not seek to 
gauge the impact of the war directly upon people.  
<FN7>Coping mechanisms are not discussed further here, but have been identified by the ICRC 
Focus Group as including: illegal connections; installation of household booster pumps (at least 1.5 
million around Iraq (!)); compact-unit water treatment plants; bottled water; private, 
neighbourhood-level reverse osmosis (desalination) plants; imports from Kuwait; generators at 
household or neighbourhood level; leaving the country; rooftop storage reservoirs. 
<FN8>The equipment is used to deliver the alum, which facilitates the removal of sediment 
suspended in the muddy river water 
<FN9>These self-contained compact water treatment plants, which can be dropped in by trailer and 
so appear to be quick-fix solutions, were very popular as a relief intervention (there were 91 
compact units around Basrah in 1991, and 430 by 2015 (Al Janoob,  2015). Because of their 
sophisticated technology, reliance on chemicals, and poor ability to deal with turbid water, these 
compact units have proven very ill suited for southern Iraqi villages. 
<FN10>In some cases (e.g. Ninevah), there was a shortage even of bleaching powder (CARE 
International, 1997). 
<FN11>A fourth source of vulnerability may derive from interdependence with other systems. The 
internal documentation demonstrates the clear relation between electricity and water (without the 
former there is none of the latter). With the failure of the national electricity grid and very low cost 
of diesel fuels, most water systems became reliant upon electrical generators, though these have 
proven very difficult to maintain (Int Doc 059, 1998). Transportation (e.g. of treatment chemicals) 
and the reaction of some international companies fearing the consequences of breaking the 
embargo are further sources of vulnerability arising from interdependence.  
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